AP‐2 is a recent significant addition to the list of transcription factors that have been demonstrated by targeted gene disruption to be essential for normal development. Two recent reports of AP‐2 null mutant mice(1,2) indicate that AP‐2 holds a key position in the network of genes and proteins controlling developmental pattern and morphogenesis, and that it is particularly important for development of the cranial region and for midline fusions.

Bhattacharyya, K. The Advaita concept of subjectivity.--Deutsch, E. Reflections on some aspects of the theory of rasa.--Nakamura, H. The dawn of modern thought in the East.--Organ, T. Causality, Indian and Greek.--Chatterjee, M. On types of classification.--Lacombe, O. Transcendental imagination.--Bahm, A. J. Standards for comparative philosophy.--Herring, H. Appearance, its significance and meaning in the history of philosophy.--Chang Chung-yuan. Pre-rational harmony in Heidegger's essential thinking and Chʼan thought.--Staal, J. F. Making sense of the Buddhist tetralemma.--Enomiya-Lassalle, H. M. The mysticism of Carl Albrecht (...) and Zen.--Parrinder, G. The nature of mysticism.--Cairns, G. E. Axiological contributions of East and West to the spiritual development of mankind.--Mayeda, S. Śaṇkara's view of ethics.--Mercier, A. On peace.--Barlingay, S. S. A discussion of some aspects of Gaudapāda's philosophy. (shrink)

Until recently, psychologists have conceptualised and studied trust in God (TIG) largely in isolation from contemporary work in theology, philosophy, history, and biblical studies that has examined the topic with increasing clarity. In this article, we first review the primary ways that psychologists have conceptualised and measured TIG. Then, we draw on conceptualizations of TIG outside the psychology of religion to provide a conceptual map for how TIG might be related to theorised predictors and outcomes. Finally, we provide a research (...) agenda for future empirical work in this area, as well as practical applications for counsellors and religious leaders. (shrink)

This chapter explores reasons to doubt the defensibility of the “weak theory of sustainability” that informs and justifies the use of cost-benefit analysis by environmental regulators. As the argument reveals, inasmuch as the weak theory equates what is sustainable with what sustains the satisfaction of human preferences, it has the surprising philosophical wherewithal to make climate-changing activities sustainable, at least in principle. This would be so if human ingenuity made possible the replacement of ecosystem services with technological alternatives. And it (...) would be particularly so if the aesthetic goods that derive from nature – goods which are resistant to quantification – are excluded from environmental cost-benefit analyses. But it is also true if those aesthetic goods are reduced to mere human preferences that can be measured through indirect market-based means, for aesthetic preferences are remarkably adaptive.Inasmuch as people can be expected to come to appreciate landscapes degraded by climate change, those who defend a weak theory of sustainability can expect that climate change will not long be at odds with what people find aesthetically pleasing. However, as the growing literature on “nature-deficit disorder” suggests, while aesthetic preferences may be elastic, aesthetic needs are not. As climate change progressively strips us of nature’s goods, we will lose the ability to meet crucial aesthetic needs. The irony is clear: As our aesthetic preferences bend towards the acceptance of ecological loss, we will predictably lose our preferences for meeting our own enduring aesthetic needs. We can thus expect climate change to cause us to prefer what we do not need and to need what we do not prefer. And this implies that climate change is the reductio ad absurdum of the weak theory of sustainability that dominates contemporary environmental regulation. (shrink)

Is it harder to acquire knowledge about things that really matter to us than it is to acquire knowledge about things we don't much care about? Jason Stanley 2005 argues that whether or not the relational predicate 'knows that' holds between an agent and a proposition can depend on the practical interests of the agent: the more it matters to a person whether p is the case, the more justification is required before she counts as knowing that p. The evidence (...) for Stanley's thesis includes a number of intuitive judgments about examples. In this paper we provide parallel examples for which Stanley's thesis requires unwelcome knowledge-attributions, and argue that this is possible because his thesis conflicts with familiar and plausible principles about knowledge. (shrink)

The Search for the Legacy of the USPHS Syphilis Study at Tuskegee is a collection of essays from experts in a variety of fields seeking to redefine the legacy of the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Study. The essayists place the legacy of the study within the evolution of racial and ethnic relations in the United States. Contributors include two leading historians on the study, two former United States Surgeons General, and other prominent scholars from a wide range of fields.

This qualitative cross-sectional survey, undertaken in the antenatal booking clinics of a hospital in central London, explores pregnant women’s responses to routine HIV testing, examines their reasons for declining or accepting the test, and assesses how far their responses fulfil standard criteria for informed consent. Of the 32 women interviewed, only 10 participants were prepared for HIV testing at their booking interview. None of the women viewed themselves as being particularly at risk for HIV infection. The minority of the participants (...) who declined testing differed from those who accepted, by interpreting test acceptance as risky behaviour, privileging the negative outcomes of HIV positivity and expressing an inability to cope with these, should they occur. Troublingly, only a minority of women had a broad understanding of the rationale for the test, and none fulfilled the standard criteria for informed consent. This study suggests that, although routine screening combined with professional recommendation may be successful in increasing uptake, this may be at the cost of eroding informed consent. Protecting third parties from a preventable disease may outweigh the moral duty of respecting autonomy, enshrined in Western bioethical tradition. Nevertheless, such a policy should be made transparent, debated in the public domain and negotiated with women seeking antenatal care. (shrink)

In study 1, the time when aggressive fighting involving 8 and 11 year‐old children took place was examined by means of direct playground observations during lunch‐time recess. There was a tendency, significant in the younger group, for there to have been more fights in the last quarter of recess. In study 2, the causes of fights, the sex of the participants, the proportion of fights that were escalated by other children joining in in a non‐conciliatory way, and the proportion in (...) which children intervened to stop the fights were investigated, again by means of direct playground observations. The most common causes of fights were disputes over some aspect of a rule‐governed game, teasing, retaliations to accidental hurt/injury, and to a lesser extent disputes over space. Most of the fights that were observed involved boys only , and only a minority involved boys and girls or just girls . Most fights were not escalated by other children and most fights did not involve attempts to stop them by other children. In study 3, interview data concerning children's views on fighting are reported. Many children expressed generally negative attitudes towards fighting, and there appeared to be several common ‘barriers’ that deterred children from participating. On the other hand, some children also articulated reasons why they sometimes felt it was necessary to fight. The significance of the results from the three studies for managing children's aggressive behaviour in schools is discussed. (shrink)

Now in a thoroughly revised and expanded third edition, this authoritative Handbook reviews current knowledge about all aspects of emotion and its role in human ...

Although death by neurologic criteria is legally recognized throughout the United States, state laws and clinical practice vary concerning three key issues: the medical standards used to determine death by neurologic criteria, management of family objections before determination of death by neurologic criteria, and management of religious objections to declaration of death by neurologic criteria. The American Academy of Neurology and other medical stakeholder organizations involved in the determination of death by neurologic criteria have undertaken concerted action to address variation (...) in clinical practice in order to ensure the integrity of brain death determination. To complement this effort, state policymakers must revise legislation on the use of neurologic criteria to declare death. We review the legal history and current laws regarding neurologic criteria to declare death and offer proposed revisions to the Uniform Determination of Death Act and the rationale for these recommendations. (shrink)

This is a collection of twenty-five papers and reviews by the leading analytic philosopher of our time. It adds to the papers on metaphysics and epistemology to be found in his previous two-volume collection published by Oxford University Press. One previously unpublished paper—“Why Conditionalize?”—is included. Australasian philosophers may note with some pride that eleven of the pieces were first published in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.